Journal Article

The Philosophy of the 'Connerotte Judgment'

Original title (French): La philosophie de « l'arrêt Connerotte »

Journal des Procès, 1997

Written in French — title, summary and keywords translated

Keywords

  • Judicial impartiality
  • Connerotte judgment
  • Judicial procedure
  • Fundamental principles of justice
  • Rule of law
  • Discourse ethics
  • Dutroux
  • Legitimate suspicion
  • Right to a fair trial
  • Removal of a judge from a case

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Abstract

Benoit Frydman analyzes the philosophical foundations of the Connerotte decision, in which Belgium's Court of Cassation disqualified a judge from the Dutroux investigation. The author challenges the criticism that the court merely applied the law mechanically, demonstrating instead that it grounded its decision on fundamental principles of democratic justice—particularly judicial impartiality and the right to a fair trial—rather than on explicit legal text. Frydman argues that the court's interpretation reflects a procedural conception of justice based on discussion ethics, requiring not only an impartial judge but also one properly informed; consequently, the court should have heard the victims before pronouncing the disqualification, as procedural principles demand that all parties be given access to the hearing and the opportunity to present their arguments.

Read the summary in the original language (French)

Benoit Frydman analyzes the philosophical foundations of the Connerotte decision, in which Belgium's Court of Cassation disqualified a judge from the Dutroux investigation. The author challenges the criticism that the court merely applied the law mechanically, demonstrating instead that it grounded its decision on fundamental principles of democratic justice—particularly judicial impartiality and the right to a fair trial—rather than on explicit legal text. Frydman argues that the court's interpretation reflects a procedural conception of justice based on discussion ethics, requiring not only an impartial judge but also one properly informed; consequently, the court should have heard the victims before pronouncing the disqualification, as procedural principles demand that all parties be given access to the hearing and opportunity to present their arguments.

Themes

  • Justice, Trials & Courts
  • Rule of Law, Democracy & Human Rights
  • Philosophy & Theory of Law

Full text

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Cite this work

« La philosophie de l'arrêt Connerotte », Journal des Procès, 1997, n° 324, pp. 10-14.
@article{frydman_1997_philosophie_arret_connerotte,
  author = {Frydman, Benoit},
  title = {La philosophie de « l'arrêt Connerotte »},
  journal = {Journal des Procès},
  year = {1997},
  number = {324},
  pages = {10--14}
}
TY  - JOUR
AU  - Frydman, Benoit
TI  - La philosophie de « l'arrêt Connerotte »
JO  - Journal des Procès
PY  - 1997
IS  - 324
SP  - 10
EP  - 14
ER  -

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